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Operational risk and the three lines of defence in UK financial institutions: 





There has been growing interest in the need for financial services firms to develop and 
implement robust systems and structures for managing operational risk. While there now 
appears to be some consensus in terms of definitions, quantification and modelling, firms are 
struggling with the qualitative side of operational risk management, particularly in relation to 
financial institutions’ operational risk governance, where the three-lines of defence model has 
become standardised. At the same time, corporate scandals post-financial crisis continue to 
indicate deficiencies in operational risk governance.  As a result, our paper examines the 
three lines of defence in the context of operational risk management in UK financial 
institutions, focusing upon roles and responsibilities and then analyses the effectiveness of the 
traditional three lines of defence model. We find a lack of common understanding of the 
lines of defence in financial institutions which is leading to duplication of roles and gaps in 
coverage. This is concerning for the industry, the economy and regulators. 
 















Operational risk is by no means a new phenomenon; nevertheless it is an increasingly 
significant issue within the financial services industry (Tescher et al, 2008; McCormack 
and Sheen, 2013).   Among the factors attributed to its rise, Sironi and Resti (2007) and 
Kallenberg (2009) note increased dependency on technology and automation, increasing 
complexity of new products in financial services globalisation, and regulation and de-
regulation of the financial services industry. These factors have created higher degrees 
of complexity and uncertainty in business operations, making operations and the 
operating environment riskier; and alongside widely publicised cases adding to 
significant losses, have led to a renewed interest in operational risk management 
amongst financial institutions, regulators and academics (Waring, 2001; Helbok and 
Wagner, 2006; McCormack and Sheen, 2013).   In turn, financial institutions have 
recognised the need to develop more focused and coherent approaches for managing 
operational risk. 
Traditionally, if they defined and managed operational risk at all, financial institutions 
relied on ‘stand-alone’ risk managers, control functions, auditors, and insurance, all 
operating largely independently from each other, to manage operational risk (see 
Buchelt and Unteregger 2004; Medova and Berg-Yeun, 2009). However, such a ‘silo’ 
approach to operational risk management resulted in gaps in analysis, a lack of process 
to aggregate critical risks, and inadequacies in sharing risk information across 
organisations. As a result, financial institutions have increasingly come to place reliance 
on the so called ‘three lines of defence’ as a model of risk governance (Bontis 2001; 
Illies et al, 2006).   
3 
 
While any framework for operational risk management and governance should exist 
within an enterprise risk framework (reflecting the nature, culture and structure of an 
organisation itself), industry, regulators and academic literature have all promoted the 
implementation of the three lines of defence governance model (3LOD).  Anderson & 
Daugherty (2012) Basel (2012) Hughes (2011) IIA (2013) and Tescher et al. (2008) all 
argue that it provides the most effective way to integrate risk governance and 
communicate risk amongst the various functions involved in operational risk 
management and control, as well as assigning responsibilities and clarifying roles 
between the various functions,  throughout financial institutions.  As a consequence, the 
3LOD has been widely adopted and generally accepted as a standard approach by 
financial institutions (PWC, 2012) as well as having become integral to regulators’ 
approaches to regulating operational risk (BCBS, 2014).  The financial services sector is 
not alone in this approach to operational risk (see COSO 2015) but the 3LOD has been 
particularly relied upon to ensure operational risks and controls are comprehensively 
assigned, coordinated, monitored and communicated within financial institutions  (FSA 
2010; BCBS 2014). 
Yet, as the 3LOD approach has developed within financial institutions, it is also clear 
that they have continued to incur major operational risk losses (de Fontouvelle et al., 
2006; BCBS 2009).  Whilst these events have influenced developments in operational 
risk management (Power, 2005; McCormack and Sheen, 2013) the more recent fallout 
from the LIBOR scandal (Koblenz et al, 2014) indicates that problems may remain in 
the implementation of the 3LOD to address operational risks.  This paper therefore 
examines the operation of the 3LOD in major UK financial institutions, and in 
particular draws attention to differences between the ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ of the 
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3LOD model, highlighting differences that may create challenges in managing 
operational risk.  It adds to recent literature by identifying potential difficulties in the 
how the 3LOD are implemented (see, for example, Ashby et al. 2012 and Power et al., 
2013), and provides evidence pointing to ways financial institutions may improve the 
implementation of the 3LOD and thereby their management of operational risk.   
Defining the three lines of defence approach and its variations 
Traditionally, the 3LOD found in operational risk management has been based on 
‘defence in depth’, providing safeguards through ‘layers’ of risk management and risk 
monitoring (Reason, 1990). A key element of this approach is that each layer, and its 
accompanying responsibilities and accountabilities, are clearly delineated (Bontis 2000; 
Illies et al, 2006). The first line consists of business frontline staff who undertake tasks 
within assigned limits of risk exposure and are responsible and accountable for 
identifying, assessing and controlling the risks within their business function. In 
addition, they are responsible for implementing corrective actions to address, process 
and control deficiencies. Essentially, as outlined by the BCBS (2014) and Chambers 
(2014), the first line of defence involves day to day risk management at the operational 
level. 
The second line of defence concerns the risk management function, often comprising of 
the operational risk management (ORM) and compliance functions. The second line of 
defence’s responsibilities includes designing the operational risk management tools to 
be used by the first line to identify and manage risks.  In addition, it applies an 
‘independent challenge’ to the use and output of the operational risk management tools 
deployed, and develops and maintains policies, standards and guidelines concerning the 
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management of risk (IIA, 2013; FSA 2012; Chambers, 2014). Bryce et al, (2013) state 
that the second line of defence monitors the risk policies, appetite and controls which 
the first line must follow.  
The third line of defence, the internal audit function, provides independent assurance 
that both the first and second lines of defence are operating effectively (McCormack 
and Sheen, 2013). Internal audit review both the business frontline and the oversight 
functions to ensure that they are carrying out their tasks to the required level of 
competency.  
In order to ensure the 3LOD framework is operating effectively, executive officers, 
boards and risk committees receive reports from audit, oversight and the business, 
enabling them to act on items of concern from any of the three lines (IIA, 2013).  
However, it remains imperative that the executive also articulates a clear vision of the 
approach to risk management required across the organisation to achieve its overall 
objectives; which, in turn, provides the necessary ‘tone from the top’ to inform the risk 
management policies, procedures and cultures that must underpin the 3LOD.  The BIS 
(2010) identifies the essential role of executive management, along with the board, in 
helping to set the correct ‘tone at the top’: providing oversight of those they manage; 
ensuring that an institution’s activities are consistent with business strategy and that risk 
tolerances/appetites and policies are approved by the board. As noted by Doughty 
(2011), the challenge is ensuring that the expectations of senior management and the 
operational practice of the 3LOD are aligned.  When correctly embedded within an 
enterprise-wide approach to the management of risk, it is argued that the 3LOD can 
provide a coherent and comprehensive approach to operational risk management, 
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reducing the frequency and impact of risk events and reflecting the risk culture, appetite 
and objectives of the organisation. To achieve this, the least that is required is that 
financial institutions position the board and executive management within, as opposed 
to separate from, the lines of defence.   
However, in practice this ideal has proved culturally and operationally problematic, and 
there has emerged a number of ‘versions’ of the 3LOD model (McCormack and Sheen, 
2013; Ashby et al, 2012). These versions have tended to extend the lines, or ‘layers’, of 
defence to incorporate the executive of an organisation, as well as other stakeholders, 
within the lines of defence (see Drury, 2009; Deloitte, 2012; Lyons 2015; Protiviti, 
2013). For example, Lyons argues that elected board members should be assigned with 
responsibility for jointly overseeing the activities of the organization and be accountable 
to the shareholders for the organization’s strategy and performance, and so argues 
(Lyons 2011, 2015) for a clearly established fourth internal line of defence: board 
committees and sub-committees, and a fifth internal line of defence: the board of 
directors itself.    The fourth line provides “oversight of individual defence activities, 
such as governance, risk management, and compliance” (2011:5), with the Board being 
“the last custodians of the internal corporate oversight process” (2011:15).  In fact, 
Lyons (2011) goes further in identifying four further, ‘external’ lines of defence, 
incorporating external auditors, shareholders, ratings agencies and regulators.   
 
Although the potential monitoring roles of certain bodies external to financial 
institutions is well-established; as a matter of practice, if a ‘lines of defence’ model is to 
be adopted by banking organisations, then it must inevitably have an internal focus.  In 
this regard, Lyons’ position concerning ‘internal’ lines of defence can be interpreted as 
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an attempt to more clearly articulate executive management’s position in any ‘lines of 
defence’ model. Lyons believes that the elected board members should be assigned with 
responsibility for jointly overseeing the activities of the organization and be accountable 
to the shareholders for the organization’s strategy and performance.  So whilst the 
traditional 3LOD recognises an oversight role for executive management and the board 
of directors, it might be argued it fails to adequately position and incorporate these roles 
within a holistic and strategic ‘lines of defence’ model. 
In a slightly different approach to broadening the 3LOD, Protiviti (2013) characterises 
the first line of defence as the ‘tone of the organisation’, capturing “the collective 
impact of the tone at the top, tone in the middle, and tone at the bottom on risk 
management, compliance and responsible business behaviour” (Protiviti, 2013:2).  
Broadly speaking, this might be regarded as the risk culture of the organisation (see 
IRM, 2012).  The difficulty with this approach to the lines of defence is that it moves 
away from using the 3LOD model to identify specific roles and to allocate 
responsibility for those roles: treating a line of defence as being constituted by one 
particular characteristic, or state, of an organisations ‘tone’. 
The issue of how that state is created, and how responsibility for creating it is allocated, 
is left unanswered.  In fact, if that ‘state’ can be regarded as the risk culture of the 
organisation, it might be suggested that it involves a complicated and recursive inter-
relationship with both the attitudes and behaviours within that organisation (IRM, 
2012).  This goes well beyond specific roles and responsibilities and so Protiviti’s first 
line of defence is perhaps best regarded as acknowledging the importance of the 
8 
 
environment within which the 3LOD operate to the latter’s effectiveness, rather than 
constituting a line of defence in itself.   
Another interesting line of thought draws attention to the effectiveness of the traditional 
3LOD arguing that as businesses increase in size and regulatory and risk environments 
become more complex, the three lines become more blurred or ‘fuzzy’ (see Ashby et al, 
2012; PWC, 2012; Deloitte, 2012; Power et al., 2013). As such, while the 3LOD model, 
as promulgated by regulators and industry bodies, generally provides a clear operational 
model with obvious distinctions between each of the three lines, in practice the model is 
being adapted by institutions to meet the exigencies of coping with an increasingly 
complex business environment. This can result, for example, in “role tensions and 
ambiguities at the interface between the first and second line” (Power et al., 2013:29).   
Despite these differences in approach, it is clearly recognised that, fundamentally, 
senior executives and the board of directors collectively have responsibility for 
establishing an organization’s objectives, defining high-level strategies to achieve those 
objectives, and establishing governance structures to best manage risk (FSA, 2010; 
BCBS, 2014; COSO, 2015).  At the same time, it is also apparent that a ‘lines of 
defence’ model, and specifically the 3LOD model, is regarded as the basis of managing 
risk within financial institutions. It is the operationalization of the 3LOD model in 
financial institutions, the manner in which the model is being customised to fit financial 
institution operations, and the challenges this creates, that are the focus of this research. 
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Methodology and Discussion  
The current paper is part of a broader study investigating operational risk governance 
and internal control frameworks in UK financial institutions since the 2000s. Whilst the 
population for this study was employees experienced in operational risk management in 
financial institutions incorporated in the United Kingdom, the selection of the research 
sample was guided by Basel II’s definition of large internationally active financial 
institutions. These institutions vary from firms where investment banking is the main 
driver of revenue to others where investment banking is just one of several businesses 
and does not dominate the overall business agenda or revenue profile of the financial 
group (Mullin, 2006). Importantly, these institutions are the most influential, and the 
ones that would have both implemented ORM techniques as required by Basel and most 
likely adopted what were considered to be good or best practices concerning operational 
risk in general, and the 3LOD in particular.  
The source of data is interviews with operational risk managers, senior financial 
institution operatives and operational risk consultants working within the financial 
institutions that are the subject of this study. The interviewees were chosen based on a 
non-probability judgement basis, which enabled data to be gathered from interviewees 
encapsulating a wide range of experience and characteristics (Marshall, 1996). In this 
regard, each participant was chosen in relation to their exposure to, and experience in, 
operational risk management and governance. In all, twenty five semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with operational risk managers, operational risk training 
consultants and operational risk officers in UK financial institutions between May 2013 
and April 2014. The data was then transcribed and thematically analysed. 
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As we have discussed, there has been unrelenting pressure on financial organisations to 
pay more attention to their operational risk management and governance, particularly in 
the aftermath of the 2007-2010 financial crises. As a result, when discussing operational 
risk, 3LOD became a ‘catch phrase’, frequently used in all interviews and subtleties in 
approach needed to be teased out.  For example, the term was generally used in a 
manner that assumed a common understanding, and implied a ‘taken for grantedness’:  
We have the 3 lines of defence like most banks here….. and most of the analysis is 
made by the first line (Interviewee 24) 
There is also growing awareness of the three lines of defence and that we can’t leave 
this (risk management) to other people (Interviewee 02)   
Three lines of defence is kind of helpful in getting the idea across that risk needs to be 
embedded on a day-to-day (Interviewee 08) 
In this bank the 3 lines of defence is quite mature it has been around for a long time 
(Interviewee 19) 
The implication and assumption was that the nature and function of the 3LOD was 
generally agreed and understood across these organisations and, indeed, the industry.  
However, on further probing, we found, as expected from previous studies (e.g. Power 
et al., 2013) a need to dig beneath the surface, and the themes that emerged from this 
analysis are discussed below.    
Co-existence of a central risk management function and the three lines of defence model 
We found evidence that a majority of financial institutions have adopted the 3LOD 
model in some shape or form in line with that reported by, amongst others, the FSA 
(2010) and the BCBS (2014).  Interestingly, the majority of interviewees indicated that 
a centralised operational risk management function has, to a significant extent, been 
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replaced by the 3LOD model.  Meaning that institutions are using the 3LOD model as a 
foundation on which to build upon: 
In terms of structures I would say it’s a combination of central units and it being 
managed in the business line. Strictly speaking I would say most banks of different 
sizes have adopted a 3LOD model (interviewee 08). 
The expertise for the risk function was built up in the (central) risk teams and then 
developed into where we need to build more risk knowledge as in when we had the 
central unit, but now they have lifted them and put them back into full time business so 
this has then created the back-up structure, the risk and control structure. (Interviewee 
05) 
However, it was also clear from the interviews that, for some financial institutions, 
centralised operational risk management functions still co-existed alongside the first 
line of defence. This could suggest some financial institutions’ operational risk 
governance processes may still be ‘migrating’ over to the 3LOD model – which could 
create issues and missed risk events.  This finding is in line with recent evidence from 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) which, on reviewing operational 
risk practices, found that “many banks also noted that they are still in the process of 
implementing a more refined approach to assigning specific responsibilities to the three 
lines of defence” (BCBS, 2014:5)  That said, interviewees in this study did not refer to 
centralised risk management as some kind of transition or temporary situation, but were 
more likely to refer to it as a ‘support and back up structure’  (see Interviewee 05 
above).   It may therefore be argued that, rather than a transition or ‘refining’ process, 
some financial institutions may lack confidence, or be unwilling, to allocate day-to-day 
risk management completely to business functions, and seek comfort in their centralised 
risk function in support. 
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This can clearly create problems for institutions and regulators if this situation 
continued in the more medium to long term – belying the rationale of the 3LOD 
approach.  First, there is a danger that having such a ‘belt and braces’ approach may 
result in a lack of clear division between the first and second lines of defence, resulting 
in the kind of blurring noted in existing literature (Ashby et al, 2012; PWC, 2012; 
Deloitte, 2012; Power et al., 2013). Second, that lack of clarity can also result in 
complacency or gaps as a result of dubiety in role responsibilities when it comes to 
operational risk management.  Third, the expected operational efficiencies in resource 
allocation and communication gained through the implementation of the 3LOD may be 
diminished.  Clearly, regulators need to aware of these issues in order to monitor the 
effectiveness of operational risk management both within and between institutions. 
Model Flexibility, Gaps and Duplication 
In the course of the interviews, it became clear that financial institutions were 
implementing the 3LOD model in a way that suited their size and operating structure, 
and this seemed to result in differences with regard to exactly how lines of defence 
(particularly the first and second lines) operated in practice. Such differences should 
raise alarm bells about the agreed upon nature of the 3LOD model,  as more than half of 
our interviewees claimed there was no clear cut distinction as to where the demarcations 
between lines of defence are drawn, and exact points of demarcation varied: 
… and where it gets more complicated is in the second line of defence where you often 
have people whose responsibility it is to exercise oversight over a specific business unit 
and then you have a group of people who exercise general oversight so obviously if the 
people who are exercising oversight on a business unit that get drawn too closely to the 
business unit then they cease to do their main function which is to challenge that 
business unit (Interviewee 11) 
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It is within each individual and business line so if they (first line) can do risk function 
themselves, we can carry out oversight …. but there should be more clarity as to what 
they should do and what we should do then we can facilitate that and provide oversight 
(Interviewee 03). 
The three lines of defence ….Its largely a question of where accountability lies, where 
ownership lies and I think one of the important aspects of the structure of the way risk is 
managed is to have that clarity around who is responsible for what (Interviewee 13) 
As well as underlining points made previously, these findings suggest that the 
demarcation of roles between the first and the second line of defence is, indeed, fuzzy 
(Ashby et al, 2012; PWC, 2012; Deloitte, 2012; Power et al., 2013). A key area of 
concern was found to be in the second line, with the oversight function becoming more 
involved with the business line than the traditional 3LOD structure would suggest.  As 
the quotes above indicate, there can be a divergence between theory and practice as the 
second line eventually ‘moves over’ to undertake some of the responsibilities of the first 
line. This creates a gap in the governance framework as the second line loses its 
‘independent’ powers of oversight and challenge. Further, it may create an element of 
duplication between the first line and the ‘moved over’ second line. This certainly 
supports the findings of blurred lines of responsibilities reported by Ashby et al. (2012). 
Yet, our research also suggests that, in this blurred and fuzzy space which falls between 
the lines, there is a varying range of activities that are being undertaken by the second 
line of defence. In some institutions it appeared the second line undertook the cross 
consolidating and analysis of data, whilst in others the analysis of data was done by the 
first line and the second line reviewed the figures. Yet again, in other financial 
institutions the focus was on providing support to the first line of defence: 
So I am in the second line of defence and we deal very much with cross consolidating 
the data that we get from the business lines and also for operational risk as a 
framework or discipline we look at rolling out the RCSA process regularly and event 
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management process and also operational risk scenario analysis process and for 
operational risk ….. I suppose that is it in a nutshell (Interviewee04)  
We have the 3 lines of defence here and most of the analysis is made by the first line 
and we in the second line look at them and review them (Interviewee24)  
So in terms of operational risk we provide the framework, measure adherence to policy 
and the whole structure and it varies with banks so, we use the policies that I have said, 
the application of guidance and support to support business and we cover challenge 
and monitoring on a regular basis, be it new products or monthly reporting we are 
coming through with the challenge (Interviewee05) 
Such confusion can lead to problems, suggesting there is a lack of common 
understanding in institutions concerning the functions and responsibilities of the second 
line of defence, and indeed of the allocation of responsibilities across the 3LOD more 
generally. Acknowledging differences in size and operations of different organisations, 
our evidence may also suggest that the 3LOD is being applied in a more flexible and 
pragmatic manner, reflecting the operational needs and exigencies of individual 
organisations.  Certainly, when probed, none of the interviewees raised mentioned being 
unable to provide challenge and oversight as an issue. The apparent flexibility and 
pragmatism found in our data also supports the finding elsewhere that in some cases the 
second line has become more of a risk management enabler as opposed to a risk 
challenger and overseer (Power et al. distinguish between ‘Partnership Builders’ and 
‘Partnership Overseers’ (Power et al., 2013:40)).  Such ‘enabling’ may stray into areas 
that some might ascribe to the first line of defence, and the rationale of the model itself 
suggests this will result in duplication and inefficiency. Just as likely, it may create a 
challenge to the independence of the second line of defence if those in the second line 
must challenge the work they have contributed to in the first line of defence.   
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The sub-lines within the 3LOD 
Our findings as reported so far suggest that, in an attempt to cope with the inevitable 
business and organisational complexity of managing risk, financial institutions have 
adopted a flexible approach to the implementation of the 3LOD which, in turn, has led 
to blurring of lines. Yet our evidence, and existing literature, also suggests that this 
flexibility has resulted in the nascent development of different roles within the 3LOD 
structure.  In order to move beyond the notion of ‘blurring’ of the lines of defence, and 
at the same time retain the potential of the 3LOD as a comprehensive model, it is 
necessary to begin to sketch out how attempts to develop the 3LOD, and particularly the 
relationship between the first and second lines of defence, may be understood in the 
context of the model itself. 
One of the themes that emerged from our study is that although it is still regarded as the 
3LOD, the approach has been adapted as institutions have latently evolved more than 
the standard three lines of defence:  
So for me the key is 3LODs, I have seen 7LODs I have certainly seen 5 where it gets 
complicated is of course for a lot of business units they have embedded operational risk 
offices in the business units so you end up have a 1a, 1b and 1b being the embedded 
office ….. (Interviewee11) 
A number of financial institutions do I think introduce an additional layer… line so there 
is I suppose you could call that a level 1a which sits between levels one and 
two(Interviewee14) 
This development should be distinguished from the earlier discussion of Lyons (2011) 
Protiviti (2013), since the results of the interviews suggest that these additional lines 
have evolved within the model, rather than expanded the scope of the model. The 
suffixes (‘a’, ‘b’) indicate these layers exist within, or between, the original lines – 
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specifically within or between the first and second lines of defence. The use of the 
suffixes by the interviewees (as opposed to calling them lines 4 or 5) may also suggest 
they should not be given the same prominence as the original 3LOD; they are ‘sub-
lines’ of defence.  
Having established the existence of the sub-lines of defence we now go on to examine 
the characteristics of these sub-lines in more detail.  
Characteristics of the sub-lines of defence 
It might have been logical to expect the additional sub-lines to be in the second line of 
defence – mainly due to the range of the activities that are expected in this line – for 
example in many cases we found that this line was doing the work that should have 
been absorbed into the first line of defence.  However, our interviewees consistently 
referred to sub-lines 1a and 1b and it became difficult to discern a consensus around a 
clear and unambiguous purpose for these sub-lines.  Most interviewees differed on the 
purposes the sub-lines served – suggesting learning by doing approach and that 
institutions may well still be operating in a more ‘siloed’ way than chief executives and 
boards would like to admit. We found that the sub-lines are addressing the practical 
complexities that full implementation of the 3LOD approach creates for an institution. 
In some cases, it also appeared the sub-lines were acting as ‘comfort blankets’ which 
should make it difficult for any poor risk management to slip through. Interestingly, two 
particular themes emerged:  





A number of financial institutions do, I think, introduce an additional layer which 
is sort of a risk co-ordination role, which sits within the first line, within the 
business reporting to the first line and does functional reporting to, and across, 
the second line so there is, I suppose you could call that a level 1a, which sits 
between levels one and two that’s quite common and helpful I think, as it kind of 
bridges the gap between the business and the specialist function (Interviewee 
14) 
ii) Sub-lines within the first line of defence as an embedded oversight risk function: 
The 1a piece of the first line of defence, the people that are doing the business 
must always own the risk…… and 1b being the embedded oversight office 
…they facilitate the development of the framework of operational risk in the 
business units but they must never own the risk (Interviewee11) 
We do have risk people in the various business lines but there is a dedicated 
team that forms like an oversight… maybe that is 1b The risks are owned by 
the business lines which is 1a if I can put it that way and the 1b risk team is 
there to kind of support, make reviews etc. (Interviewee04)  
The co-ordinating role may be understood as a means of helping ensure the 
effectiveness of the ‘partnership’ approach between the first and second line, as 
identified by Power et al. (2013).  Here, the sub-line sits within the first line of defence 
with the purpose of ensuring the second line receives appropriate, adequate and timely 
risk information from the first line. This avoids the ‘blurring’ that arises when the 
second line ends up having to collect the data that they are then supposed to ‘police and 
challenge.’ 
By contrast, the embedded risk function goes further in embedding a 
business/supervisory operational risk function within the first line of defence.  On the 
one hand, this approach may be a response to limits identified in the development of 
risk management expertise amongst first line business staff or to a need for more 
resources (BSBS, 2014:36).  In this scenario, risk management expertise resides in the 
first line of defence, but specifically in staff who are distinguished, by that expertise, 
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from front line business staff (hence 1b).  Specifically identifying this role as 1(b) may 
create greater clarity, avoiding the ‘blurring’ that may arise where the second line of 
defence becomes involved in the identification and assessment of risk and controls (the 
role of the first line of defence under the traditional 3LOD).  
On the other hand, the development of these sub-lines may also be an understandable 
response by senior managers to the prospect of review by the second line of defence – 
undertaking their own ‘pre-review’ review to ensure that no significant issues are likely 
to be raised when the second line subsequently reviews the business unit. A majority of 
interviewees indicated that 1a is the business line and 1b undertakes risk controls and 
therefore is the embedded risk oversight function. Upon probing, we found that 1a is 
checked by 1b, with the second line providing oversight. What remains unclear is 
whether the second line is providing oversight to both 1a and 1b, or just one of them. 
Either there is a duplication of risk oversight, or the possibility of a lack of oversight if 
the second line of defence places any reliance on the work of line 1b. The possibility 
also exists for disagreement as a result of differences in the separate supervisory 
oversight outcomes of lines 1b and 2. 
Significantly, in terms of overall operational risk management and the avoidance of risk 
events, the majority of the interviewees believed the additional lines were bridging gaps 
and improving risk coordination and reporting.  However, a minority of the 
interviewees believed that sub-lines may create misunderstanding as to roles and 
responsibilities, and may well create more gaps. This is illustrated by another 
interviewee who commented:  
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So for me the key is 3LODs, I have seen 7LODs I have certainly seen 5 but once you 
break it down beyond those 3 then there is room for people to misunderstand their roles 
and responsibilities so in terms of roles and responsibilities and organisational layout I 
like to see some framework adopted (Interviewee 11) 
What is apparent is the rather ad hoc nature of the approaches across our interviewees’ 
institutions.  That said, whilst the need for other sub-lines is identified by some 
interviewees, this last extract suggests that rather than discussing ‘lines’ it may be more 
productive to frame the discussion in terms of the additional roles and functions being 
undertaken; for example, the ‘co-ordinating’ and ‘embedded risk oversight’ functions 
identified above.  Thereafter, the key task becomes one of structuring the additional 
identified roles and functions within the 3LOD in such a way as to cover the gaps and 
resolve the risk management issues that arise in running a complex business, whilst at 
the same time retaining the core structure and purpose of the 3LOD.  This retains an 
organisation’s ability to undertake the three core functions of operational risk 
management, challenge and independent review at the heart of the 3LOD, but to do so 
within a flexible framework which facilitates the organisation’s own risk culture and an 
enterprise-wide approach to risk management.  It must be noted, however, that there is 
no single approach across the sector and while such flexibility may be a strength, it may 
also lead to further issues regarding the capture and management of risk events. 
It should also be noted that the BCBS (2014), in discussing how more complex financial 
institutions are refining their approach to operational risk management, has identified 
lines 1a and 1b as well as 2a and 2b within the 3LOD (2014:34).  Their analysis is based 
on the examination of evidence from a wide range of financial institutions. However, 
there is a danger that the same issues experienced with the 3LOD and discussed in this 
analysis, will be replicated by this ‘enhanced’ three lines of defence.  The primary issue 
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should be effective risk management, not the ability of an organisation to evidence a 
framework with three distinct levels, or further ‘enhanced’ sub-levels, to a regulator or 
other interested parties.  To that extent, and within the broad framework and rationale of 
the 3LOD, the most important issue must be the clear identification of the risk 
management roles and functions within an organisation.  That done, lines of 
communication, removal of gaps and overlap, and ensuring the availability of necessary 
skills, can be established and embedded.  The identification of the sub-lines 1a and 1b, 
and their role and function, may be a useful contribution to this task; however, they 
should not act as an inhibitor to financial institutions refining their approach to the 
adoption of the 3LOD in operational risk management.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
Our study focuses upon the three lines of defence risk governance model which has 
been widely adopted and generally accepted as a standard approach by financial 
institution management and regulators.  We find that there is no single common 
understanding of the 3LOD in UK institutions and that there is a range of practices with 
regard to implementation of the model – blurring the lines of the model. We do find that 
the 3LOD has been adopted by financial institutions as their de facto model for 
operational risk management, but there is divergence between theory and practice. That 
said, for organisations where there is clear segregation of duties and well defined 
responsibilities, the 3LOD may simply put a name to the existing structure. Even where 
this is not the case, as in the case of most large financial institutions, attempting to adopt 
the 3LOD encourages risk practitioners, and their organisations more generally, to 
consider how they should organise and deliver operational risk management, and 
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provides a foundation for discussion within and across organisations.  Siloes, however, 
remain. 
Our study reports several themes arising in relation to the way financial institutions 
have organised themselves in implementing the 3LOD approach.  First, our research 
confirms the ‘blurring’ identified by Ashby et al. (2012).  There was evidence of the 
second line becoming involved in tasks that, according to the model, one would expect 
to be undertaken in the first line.  This sometimes appeared to be a response to the need 
to acquire the data necessary to undertake their second line supervisory role, perhaps as 
a result of lack of resources or skills to undertake this task in the first line. At the same 
time, there was also evidence of a nascent risk supervision function being carried out in 
the first line of defence.  We suggest this may be due to a desire amongst senior 
managers of business units to be satisfied that, when it comes to meeting the challenges 
of the second line of defence, their unit will perform well. 
Second, we found that this blurring has led to the development of sub-lines of defence.  
These sub-lines were highlighted by a majority of interviewees, all pointing to what 
they regarded as an embedded risk function within the first line of defence. It was clear 
that a key driver in this development was to provide more efficient co-ordination and 
communication between the first and second lines of defence by having clearly 
identifiable risk management expertise within the first line of defence.  A majority of 
interviewees indicated that 1a is the business line and 1b undertakes risk controls and 
therefore is the embedded risk function. Upon probing, we also found that alternatively 




It seems then that sub-lines 1a and 1b are developing as a means of identifying and 
enhancing risk expertise in the first line of defence, and in particular in relation to risk 
supervisory and communication capacity. What remains unclear is whether the second 
line of defence is providing oversight to both 1a and 1b, or 1a or 1b only; what amount 
of duplication exists between 1b and the second line; and whether this approach may 
create gaps in supervision or challenges to risk management in the front line of the 
business. Relations between line 1b and the second line of defence may also give rise to 
questions of whether the second line can remain independent.  
What is clear is that there remains a danger that the unique benefits of creating an 
integrated approach to operational risk management could be lost as a result of gaps or 
duplications leading to the loss of a clear and unambiguous separation and co-ordination 
of roles and responsibilities.  Practically there may be sub-lines which are not formally 
recognised as defending anything, yet informally play a significant part in the 3LOD 
structure. This could indicate flaws in formal governance structures, leading to a failure 
to provide comprehensive defence coverage for financial institutions.  
These findings also raise some important practical issues for financial institutions.  
While the 3LOD may be seen as a flexible model within which they can negotiate 
around the edges, the evidence of increasing prevalence of lines 1a and 1b suggests 
financial institutions may need to formally revise the structure of their 3LOD 
framework to improve clarity of responsibility for operational risk management. 
Equally, the existence of lines 1a and 1b may indicate a need for financial institutions to 
consider existing skill sets concerning the management of risk within the business, and 
within the 3LOD in particular. This might involve more risk management training in the 
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first line of defence so as to enable the 3LOD to operate as it is classically understood.  
Alternatively, if this classical separation is not possible, or not desirable or practical in 
specific business contexts, then there may need to be an assessment of the skill sets 
needed for roles that might be typical of 1a or 1b in a specific organisation. At the same 
time, the existence of these sub-lines may suggest a career progression path, from 1a to 
1b and then line 2, that needs to be understood and managed. 
When it comes to understanding the 3LOD in the sector, this research illustrates again 
the all too common mis-match between the theory and how it is generally assumed to be 
applied in organisations, and the variations in its practical implementation as financial 
institutions cope with the exigencies of their business. The response must be to abandon 
lazy assumptions concerning the 3LOD.  When it comes to managing operational risk, 
the best practice will come from those financial institutions who understand how their 
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